wooWhen Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982, the reaction in Britain was furious.
Most of the anger was naturally directed at the military junta which had ordered its navy to occupy the islands, but much was reserved for the government in London which lost the position.
Within days of the first Argentine troops landing in the British South Atlantic region, the press in London had condemned the then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s leading diplomats as traitors.
The late Lord Carrington, then Foreign Secretary, and Richard Loos, the then Foreign Office minister with responsibility for the Falklands Islands, resigned simultaneously, after being convinced that what they acknowledged was a serious foreign policy error. Can’t proceed.
at forty years, Independent Speaks to Lord Luce about the turbulent months leading up to the war.
In December 1981, a new junta took over in Argentina under the leadership of military dictator General Leopoldo Galtieri. He took power at a time of economic hardship which soon led to civil unrest.
Lord Luce considers this setting to be crucial to the decision to invade Buenos Aries. He says: “I think Galtieri was in such trouble with his economy, with his general attacks.
“As you know dictators, we’ve seen it lately, doing atrocious things to distract and really I think that’s probably what drives Galtieri to action.”
Argentina was also more concerned than usual with its territory in the South Atlantic, partly due to disputes with neighboring Chile over islands to the south.
At the same time, frustration was brewing in Buenos Aries over the lack of progress in talks with Britain on the Falkland Islands, a small archipelago sitting a few hundred miles east of Argentina.
British troops on the East Falkland Islands for the final attack on Port Stanley in June 1982
(Getty)
Talks had been intermittent since the mid-sixties, and by early 1982 there were signs that the junta was tired of the stalemate and was turning its mind to take power by force.
Captain Nicholas Barker, at that time the commander of Britain’s only naval presence in the South Atlantic, HMS Patiencereported London that they had been warned of imminent military action by an Argentine naval officer in January.
The official line in Britain remained for 40 years that the invasion was a surprise.
Lord Luce supports this, but believes that information was available to suggest an invasion was to come. However, he says that it was not presented to the government by the intelligence services.
He says: “Remorsefully, we were insufficiently informed on the extent of indications of possible actions in the Falkland Islands.”
HMS Endurance was Britain’s only naval representation around the Falklands.
(Alan Broomhead)
Whether or not the government was made aware of the threat, it was clear that the situation was on a knife edge and the early months of 1982 saw intense diplomacy between Britain and Argentina.
Lord Luce was at the center of talks with Argentina’s Deputy Foreign Minister Enrique Ross in New York in February.
“He was a very straightforward guy to talk to, but every time we thought I’d have a deal with him he went on the telephone and called Costa Mendez. [the foreign minister] Or Galtieri himself. Every time.” says Lord Loos of Rose.
Nevertheless they agreed to develop a framework for further negotiations. Both sides appeared satisfied with the progress and issued a joint communiqué reaffirming the resolve of both sides to find a solution.
“We went with a good statement that was ripped off when the deputy foreign minister came back to Argentina. Galtieri clearly didn’t go through with it,” he says.
Immediately thereafter, Argentina issued a unilateral communiqué stating that the aim of future talks should be to recognize Argentina’s sovereignty over the Falklands.
General Galtieri, pictured in 1982, took power in Argentina months before the invasion
(Dario La Nacion)
Lord Loos says: “That’s what made matters worse.”
Weeks later, on March 19, members of the Argentine Navy landed on South Georgia – another island under British control in the South Atlantic – under the guise of providing transportation to a scrap metal merchant doing business there.
The incident was incendiary and is now seen as a toe in the waters of the Argentine campaign. The British government, in spite of being upset, did not see the invasion as a foregone conclusion.
It was not until 29 March – three days before the invasion – that the government decided to send any military aid to the Falklands. Two submarines were ordered to travel, the first of which was not to arrive until 16 April, a fortnight after the attack.
Lord Luce admitted that it came too late.
He says: “There is one thing that we urge the government to agree to, which was to send the two submarines not late, which we had sent them, but long ago, as a precaution, and prepared to surface. And show the Argentines that we were around and alert.
“But it’s backwards and I’m not going to suggest that we do anything differently with the information we knew at the time.”
A British soldier on a helicopter patrol over East Falklands during the war
(PA)
On 30 March Lord Luce told the House of Commons that Britain would defend the Falklands if necessary. By the evening of the next day, the government had been given intelligence that an attack was coming and would take place as early as 2 April.
Intelligence was not misguided and Argentine forces landed west of Stanley, the largest settlement on the islands, in the short hours of Friday as predicted.
The Argentine flag was hoisted over the Government House shortly after noon.
In London, the Foreign Office minister, who had spent months trying to avoid this outcome, was convinced he would have to quit his job for the humiliation.
He says: “[Immediately after the invasion] I was sure whether or not we could have stopped it, someone would have to carry a can, and I determined I should. ,
Lord Carrington was eventually in charge of Britain’s diplomatic efforts.
(Getty)
“The morning the invasion was announced, I went to see Lord Carrington, and as soon as I opened the door, he looked at me and said, ‘You’re not going to do that’.”
“I said, ‘Well, I haven’t talked to you yet,’ and he said, ‘Well come and sit’.
“I explained why I felt it was my duty to resign.”
Lord Carrington persuaded him to remain in his place and asked him to work at the United Nations, rallying in support of Britain.
In Saturday’s House of Commons debate, ministers faced the fury of all sides, not least their own Conservative Party. Lord Loos says, “It is true that we were killed”.
“By Monday morning, I think Lord Carrington had begun to change his attitude,” he continues.
“So I wrote him a note saying ‘If you decide to go, I’ll go with you’.”
That morning Lord Loos left for RAF Breeze Norton in Oxfordshire to greet the Governor of the Falklands, Rex Hunt, and a group of British soldiers accompanying him from the South Atlantic.
Lord Loos recalls: “As the plane was landing, Lord Carrington called and said ‘I am going to resign’. many times Strong condemnation was written for us.”
Lord Luce says he does not regret resigning
(supplied)
many times Published an editorial that was brutal in its assessment of the pair’s failures. Lord Luce said it “described us as traitors for not stopping the invasion”.
The Foreign Secretary said he was to resign after lunch and urged Lord Luce to go back to London to inform the Prime Minister that he was also leaving.
“I arrived back with the governor, flew to Northolt, then went back to London through all the red lights, and resigned with Lord Carrington.”
Lord Luce says that the pair were obliged to give their heads for the invasion.
“The reason for my resignation and his honor was, we don’t believe we could have done anything different to stop the war.
“I never regretted the decision, although it was painful.”
The war continued until June when Argentina surrendered at Stanley. By this time 255 British soldiers had been killed, as had 649 on the Argentine side.
Lord Luce later returned to the Foreign Office and Lord Carrington became Secretary General of NATO.